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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WILLIAM REMINE, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
V • 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 940127-CA 
Priority Mo. 15 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OP PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of a 
petition for extraordinary writ brought under Rule 65B, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Remine's petition challenges a decision of the 
Utah Board of Pardons and Parole. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) (Supp. 1993) because Remine 
was convicted of a second degree felony. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Board of Pardons and Parole comply with procedural due 
process when it terminated Remine's parole based on his 
modification of the parole agreement and subsequent refusal to sign 
an unadulterated agreement? 
STANDARD OP APPELLATE REVIEW 
This appeal arises from the trial court's granting of the 
Board's motion to dismiss. Thus, the facts as alleged in the 
complaint are assumed to be true. Therefore, because this issue 
1 
raises only questions of law, this Court should give the trial 
court's ruling no deference and review it under a correctness 
standard. Citv of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co,. 796 P.2d 697 
(Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AMD RULES 
All relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules 
are attached to this brief as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for 
extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B. (R. at 125-26). Remine 
filed this petition on November 18, 1993, challenging the Board's 
termination of his parole on August 25, 1993. The trial court 
granted the Board's motion to dismiss, finding that the petition 
failed to state a claim for relief. (R. at 117; Addendum B) . 
Remine filed this appeal on February 25, 1994. (R. at 119). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Remine was committed to the Utah State Prison on June 7, 1990 
after being convicted of burglary, a third degree felony. (R. at 
74) . His sentence expires on July 12, 1995- (R. at 14) . The Board 
initially paroled Remine on April 23, 1991, but due to a parole 
violation, that parole was revoked and Remine was returned to the 
2 
prison in 1993 .l On May 13, 1993, the Board decided to grant 
Remine a new parole release date of June 8, 1993, (R. at 13). 
On May 28, 1993, in accordance with state statute and prison 
policy, an employee of the Department of Corrections presented the 
parole agreement to Remine for his signature. Remine signed the 
agreement but, prior to signing, modified it to require the Board 
to give him a new parole revocation hearing2. (R. at 15) . On June 
14, less than one week after Remine's release from prison and after 
discovering the modification, the Board directed Remine's parole 
agent to present him with a new, unmodified copy of the agreement 
for signature. (R. at 17). Remine refused to sign. (!£.) Based 
on that refusal, AP&P filed an allegation that Remine had violated 
his parole by refusing to cooperate with the Board and refusing to 
sign the agreement without making modifications. (!£.) The Board 
issued a warrant for Remine's arrest and re-incarceration pending 
a parole revocation hearing. 
The Board convened the parole revocation hearing on August 25, 
1994. Through counsel, Remine moved to dismiss the parole 
revocation allegations. (R. at 4). On August 31, 1993, the Board 
granted Remine's motion to dismiss but nevertheless rescinded the 
1
 The Board's revocation of the April 23, 1991 parole date is 
at issue before this Court in a separate appeal, Remine v. Utah 
Board of Pardons. Case No. 930752-CA. 
2
 Before the signature line on the parole agreement, Remine 
printed the following addition: "only if the Board schedules a new 
parole revocation hearing." (R. at 15; Addendum D). 
3 
June 8, 1993 parole release date, thus terminating parole and 
recommitting Remine to prison. (R. at 27) . In the same order, the 
Board gave Remine a new parole date of February 8, 1994, which was 
later rescinded due to numerous disciplinary violations at the 
prison. (Id.) Remine is still at the Utah State Prison and the 
Board has decided not to parole him again. Instead, Remine will 
remain in prison until his sentence expires on July 12, 1995. (R. 
at 14) . 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
Remine rejected parole by modifying his parole agreement. 
Under contract law, through which an analysis of this proceeding 
can be undertaken, in order to constitute an acceptance of an 
offer, the acceptance must be the mirror image of the offer. 
Remine's modification constituted not an acceptance of the parole 
agreement but a rejection and counteroffer. Thus, parole never 
actually began and the Board legitimately withdrew its offer of 
parole as soon as it discovered the alteration and reincarcerated 
Remine. 
Additionally, by giving Remine a parole revocation hearing, 
rather than a rescission hearing, the Board actually gave Remine 
more due process than required. Under the analogous situation of 
probation, a failure to sign a probation agreement means that 
probation never really occurs and a revocation hearing is not 
needed to validly withdraw the revocation offer. Similarly, in 
this case, parole never actually legally began so rescission was 
4 
appropriate. Given this, Remine's due process rights were 
respected and the Board fully complied with the law in its 
procedures. 
ARfflPMENT 
I. REMINE'S MODIFICATION OF TEE PAROLE AGREEMENT 
INDICATED BIS REJECTION OF TEE TERMS OF TEE 
AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, THE BOARD PROPERLY 
COMPLIED WITH UTAH LAW WHEN IT TERMINATED HIS 
PAROLE. 
A. Under contract law principles, 
Remine's alteration constituted a 
counteroffer and rejection of the 
Board-issued parole certificate; 
therefore, Rexaine never entered into 
a lawful parole agreement. 
On May 13, 1993, the Board of Pardons sent Remine an order 
telling him that he would be paroled on June 8, 1993. (R. at 14; 
Addendum C) . However, the order also informed Remine that his 
release would be contingent on his agreement to the conditions of 
parole, which would be evidenced by his signing the parole 
agreement. (I£.) This requirement to sign the parole agreement is 
not merely a Board decision, but is taken from state law.3 
As Remine admits in his complaint, he signed the parole 
agreement but modified it without the prior consent of the Board. 
Because the Board and Remine were not in the process of 
negotiation, Remine's unconsented modification actually constituted 
3
 "When the Board of Pardons releases an offender on parole, 
it shall issue to the parolee a certificate setting forth the 
conditions of parole which he shall accept and agree to as 
evidenced by his signature affixed to the agreement." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-27-10 (Supp. 1993). 
5 
a disagreement with the parole conditions. The parolee's signature 
normally evidences consent to the parole conditions set forth in 
the Board-issued certificate. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-10 (Supp. 
1993). Due to his addition of a new clause, however, Remine's 
signature evidenced consent not to the Board-issued certificate, 
but to a new parole agreement that the Board neither issued nor 
authorized. 
Though the parole agreement is not exactly analogous to the 
typical contract, it is helpful to review the facts in this case in 
light of contract law concepts. Invoking a principle that one 
commentator calls the "mirror-image" rule, this Court has ruled 
that an acceptance not in conformity with the offer is a 
counteroffer, not an acceptance; therefore, there is no contract. 
Cal Wadsworth Construction, v. City of St. George. 865 P.2d 1373, 
1377 n.3 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Crane v. Timberbrook Village. 
Ltd. . 774 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah App. 1989)); 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Farnsworth on Contracts. § 3.21 (Little, Brown & Co. 1990)4. In 
contract terms, the Board-issued contract constituted the offer. 
Remine's modification, being an addition to the agreement, was a 
counteroffer and his signature was merely indicative of his intent 
to be bound by the counteroffer should it be accepted. 
4
 "An attempt to add to or change the terms of the offer turns 
the offeree's response from an acceptance into a counteroffer and 
a rejection of the offer. This rule is sometimes called the 
'mirror image' rule because it requires that an acceptance be the 
mirror image of the offer." 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on 
Contracts. § 3.21, at 259 (Little, Brown & Co. 1990). 
6 
In reality then, Remine never signed a lawful parole 
agreement; his modification evidenced not only a disagreement with 
the terms of parole but a rejection of the Board's offer of parole. 
Thus, because there never was a lawful parole agreement, parole 
never technically began and Remine was not "paroled" from prison. 
He was released by mistake. 
B. Due to the lack of a lawful parole 
agreement, Remine's parole never 
began and the Board acted properly 
in issuing a warrant for his re-
incarceration and rescinding his 
parole. 
In State v. Ruesaa. 851 P.2d 1229 (Utah App. 1993) (Addendum 
E) , the trial court revoked a person's probation because he failed 
to sign the probation agreement. Because the case came up on 
appeal as a probation revocation, the Court affirmed the 
revocation; nevertheless, from the content of footnote two, it 
appears that this Court believes a revocation was not needed. X£. 
at 1231 n.2.5 Thus, the opinion provides a helpful insight into 
5
 "The written probation agreement, which details the 
conditions of probation, embodies a defendant's acceptance of 
probation and the prescribed conditions. Inasmuch as a defendant's 
refusal to sign a probation agreement manifests an unwillingness to 
accept the conditions of probation, in a sense probation never 
occurs where such unwillingness is demonstrated. If he [Ruesga] in 
fact wanted to comply with the terms of his probation, the clearest 
manifestation of such would have been to sign the agreement. . . . 
By this sequence of events, defendant himself appears to have 
refused probation, which therefore never came into being. Seen in 
this light, there may have been no probation to revoke and it is 
far from clear that an evidentiary hearing was even required." Ifl. 
7 
the actual legal effect of Remine's rejection of the parole 
agreement. 
In asserting that the trial court may not have needed to hold 
a revocation hearing, this Court implicitly found that an 
alternative procedure for imposition of the prison sentence may 
have been appropriate. By inference, the Court would have affirmed 
the trial court's action even if, rather than hold a revocation 
hearing, the trial court had merely "rescinded" the offer of 
probation and imposed the prison term based on Ruesga's rejection 
of probation. 
Although it began the proceedings to terminate Remine's parole 
as a parole revocation, in the end, the Board took the action 
impliedly suggested in Rue sera. Acting from the proposition that 
Remine's June 8 parole never legitimately began, it gave him the 
opportunity to sign a clean copy of the parole agreement (R. at 17) 
and begin parole in a proper fashion. When he refused that 
opportunity, the Board rectified the mistaken release and rescinded 
the parole.6 
6
 An inmate is not entitled to his freedom merely because he 
is mistakenly released from prison. See Green v. Christiansen, 732 
F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984) (prison authorities properly 
recommitted inmate after he was released by mistake) . Also, in 
United States v. Merritt. 478 F-Supp. 804, 807 (D.D.C. 1979), the 
court ruled that an erroneously released inmate will be excused 
from serving the balance of his sentence only if: (1) he did not 
contribute to the error; (2) the prison authorities' actions 
amounted to more than simple neglect; (3) the situation brought 
about by reincarceration would be "unequivocally inconsistent with 
fundamental principles of liberty and justice." 
8 
II. BECAUSE THE BOARD GRANTED REMINE A PAROLE 
REVOCATION HEARING, INCLUDING COUNSEL AND THE 
RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE, REMINE HAD ALL THE 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIRED FOR THIS TYPE 
OF PAROLE TERMINATION. 
Due to Ruesga's failure to sign the probation agreement, this 
Court expressed its opinion that a probation revocation evidentiary 
hearing may not have been required to satisfy due process. 
Ruescra. 851 P.2d at 1231-32 n.2. Here, Remine's parole also did 
not technically begin because he rejected the Board's offer of 
parole. By inference from Ruescra. a "rescission" of Remine's June 
8, 1993 parole date may have satisfied due process. However, 
rather than hold a rescission hearing, the Board erred on the side 
of caution and due process by holding a parole revocation hearing, 
which grants more due process protection than a mere rescission 
hearing. Compare Utah Admin. Code R671-505 (1994) with Utah Admin. 
Code R671-310 (1994); Addendum F). 
Given the Board's decision to proceed with a parole revocation 
hearing, Remine's protests that he was not afforded due process 
fall short of stating a claim for relief. Indeed, Remine 
essentially is arguing that he should have been given a rescission 
Remine does not meet these requirements. Not only did he 
contribute to the error by modifying and then signing the 
agreement# the prison's apparent failure to notice the discrepancy 
does not appear to have been more than simple neglect. Also, 
unlike those cases finding that recommitment would be fundamentally 
unfair due to the inmate's rehabilitation while free for a long 
period of time, see Shields v. Beto. 370 F.2d 1003, 1004 (5th Cir. 
1963) (attempt to commit erroneously released inmate who had been 
free for twenty-eight years) , Remine was only out for ten days and 
proved uncooperative even during that limited time. 
9 
hearing. However, the state's unilateral decision to give Remine 
more due process than required did not harm his legal interests. 
It probably benefitted him. 
Because the Board's procedures were more than adequate to 
protect Remine's constitutional right to due process, his petition 
truly fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In 
Lancaster v. Utah Board of Pardons, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 
Feb. 28, 1994), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the courts were 
not allowed to review the discretionary decisions of the Board 
regarding parole. This decision builds upon other decisions of 
this Court that recognize the Board's substantive independence from 
judicial second-guessing. Specifically, in Northern v. Barnes, 825 
P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App. 1992), aff'd Northern v. Barnes. 227 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 90 (Utah Dec. 10, 1993), this Court ruled that in 
reviewing a parole rescission a trial court could not reweigh the 
evidence and modify the Board's substantive decision to rescind 
parole. 
Therefore, because Remine cannot show a procedural due process 
violation in the Board's decision-making process, his request to 
overturn the Board's substantive decision, i.e., to withdraw the 
parole offer and recommit him to prison, fails to state a claim. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Board respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the trial court's order denying Remine's 
request for relief and dismissing the petition. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this itik day of May 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
rltiuJ^ 
ies H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
11 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I certify that on the 1*>(L day of May 1994, I caused to be 
mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
William Remine 
P.O. Box 550 
Utah State Prison 




77-27-10. Conditions of parole - Intensive early release parole program. 
(1) (a) When the Board of Pardons releases an offender on parole, it shall issue to the 
parolee a certificate setting forth the conditions of parole which he shall accept and agree to as 
evidenced by his signature affixed to the agreement. 
(b) A copy of the agreement shall be delivered to the Department of Corrections and a copy 
shall be given to the parolee. The original shall remain with the board's file. 
(2) If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to violate Section 76-5-301.1, 
Subsection 76-5-302(1), Sections 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 
76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405, is released on parole, the board shall order 
outpatient mental health counseling and treatment as a condition of parole. This subsection does 
not apply to intensive early release parole. 
(3) (a) In addition to the conditions set out in Subsection (1), the board may place offenders 
in an intensive early release parole program. The board shall determine the conditions of parole 
which are reasonably necessary to protect the community as well as to protect the interests of 
the offender and to assist the offender to lead a law-abiding life. 
(b) The offender is eligible for this program only if he: 
(i) has not been convicted of a sexual offense; or 
(ii) has not been sentenced pursuant to Section 76-3-406. 
(c) The department shall: 
(i) promulgate rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, for operation of the program; 
(ii) adopt and implement internal management policies for operation of the program; 
(iii) determine whether or not to refer an offender into this program within 120 days from 
the date the offender is committed to prison by the sentencing court; and 
(iv) make the final recommendation to the board regarding the placement of an offender 
into the program. 
(d) The department shall not consider credit for time served in a county jail awaiting trial 
or sentencing when calculating the 120 day period. 
(e) The prosecuting attorney or sentencing court may refer an offender for consideration 
by the department for participation in the program. 
(f) The board shall determine whether or not to place an offender into this program within 
30 days of receiving the department's recommendation. 
(4) This program shall be implemented by the department within the existing budget. 
(5) During the time the offender is on parole, the department shall collect from the offender 
the monthly supervision fee authorized by Section 64-13-21. 
(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead Corporation 
R671-505. Parole Revocation Hearings. 
R671-505-1. General. 
R671-505-1. General. 
Prior to the Parole Revocation Hearing, the parolee shall be given adequate written notice of 
the date, time and location of the hearing and the alleged parole violations. At the hearing, the 
offender shall be provided with an opportunity to hear the evidence in support of the allegations, 
legal counsel unless waived, an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses 
unless they would be subject to risk or harm, and an opportunity to present evidence and 
witnesses in his/her own behalf. 
Parolees are served with written allegations and notice of the hearing at least five working days 
prior to the Revocation Hearing. Such service and notice may be waived by the parolee. These 
allegations are again read at the hearing, after which the parolee enters a plea. 
The parolee may plead guilty at the initial hearing and the dispositional phase will begin 
immediately, or the Board may continue the hearing upon request of the parolee, or on its own 
motion, pending the outcome of a court criminal action or an Evidentiary Hearing. 
If a guilty plea is entered or the offender is found guilty in an Evidentiary Hearing, the Board 
will then hear discussion as to disposition from the offender or the attorney for the offender and 
the Department of Corrections. The Board may then retire to Executive Session, make a 






(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead Corp. 
R671-310. Rescission Hearings. 
R671-310-1. Rescission Hearings. 
R671-310-1. Rescission Hearings. 
Any prior Board decision may be reviewed and rescinded by the Board at any time until an 
offender's actual release from custody. 
If the rescission of a release or rehearing date is being requested by an outside party, 
information shall be provided to the Board establishing the basis for the request. Upon receipt 
of such information, the offender may be scheduled for a rescission hearing. The Boa: J may also 
review and rescind an offender's release or rehearing date on its own initiative. Except under 
extraordinary circumstances, the offender should be notified of all allegations and the date of the 
scheduled hearing at least seven calendar days in advance of the hearing. The offender may 
waive this period. 
In the event of an escape, the Board will rescind the inmate's date upon official notification 
of escape from custody and continue the hearing until the inmate is available for appearance, 
charges have been resolved and appropriate information regarding the escape has been provided. 
The hearing officer shall conduct the hearing and make an interim decision to be reviewed, 
along with a summary report of the hearing, by the Board members. 
1993 77-26-7 
(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead Coip. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REMINE, WILLIAM 
VS 
BOARD OF PARDONS 







CASE NUMBER 930906673 HC 
DATE 02/02/94 
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK DAG 
4-501 RULING 
BASED ON THE FOLLOWING, RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS 
GRANTED: 
1. PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ON RULE 65B OF UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
2. PETIOTIONER HAS FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEMDIES 
3. PETITIONER'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
4. PETITIONER'S CLAIM IS FRIVOLOUS ON ITS FACE. 
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT BECOMES MOOT. 
THE RESPONDENT SHALL PREPARE AN ORDER AND THE NECESSARY 
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
CC: LORENZO MILLER 
WILLIAM REMINE 
t\r. t i •* 
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2525 
Telephone: (801) 575-1600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 




UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, : 
Respondents. 
FINAL ORDER 
: Case No. 930906673 
: Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above-entitled matter came before this Court on 
February 2, 1994, for Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. The Court 
having issued its ruling by minute entry on that date now makes 
the following: 
ORDER 
1. The petition in this case is a petition for 
extraordinary relief that should be filed pursuant to Rule 
65B(e); however, it was improperly properly filed under Rule 
65(b) and (c) . 
2. For the reasons stated and set forth in the 





3. The relief requested by Petitioner is denied, 
4. The action is dismissed forthwith. 
DATED this ( day o f E*bruary, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
IONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Third District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 28th day of February, 1994, I caused 
to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL ORDER 
to: 
William Remine 
P.O. Box 550 
Central Utah Correctional Facility 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER OF PAROLE 
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 00032763 
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. 20102 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF BEMJHEr WILLIAM GARY 
This matter of application for parole, termination of sentencef or 
expiration of sentence having come before the Utah State Board of Pardons 
in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 13th day of May, 1993, and the 
applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to 
appearance and the Board having heard the case, issues the following order: 
It is hereby ordered that REMINE, WILLIAM GARY be paroled from the 
funishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon him/her by a judge of the hird District Court in and for the County or Salt Lake for the crime(s) of 
BURGLARY, 3rd degree felony, Expiration 07/12/95. 
The parole shall not become effective until 8th day of June, 1993. 
The applicant agrees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by 
signing the parole agreement. The parole agreement or contract shall be 
administered by duly authorised agents of the Utah State Department of 
Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant 
shall be guilty of any infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah 
State Prison or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned bv the Utah 
State Prison or is found to be in violation of any other law of the State of 
Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this Order of Parole is 
revoked and becomes null and void. 
Dated this 13th day of May, 1993. 
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this 
12th day of May, 1993, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and 
hereby affix my signature as Chairman for and on behalf of the State of 




BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAROLE AGREEMENT 
Name: REMINE, WILLIAM GARY OBSCIS No. 32763 USP No. 20102 
I agree to be directed and supervised by agents of the Utah State Department 
of Corrections and will abide the following conditions of my parole: 
1. RELEASE: On the day of my release from the institution or confinement, 
I will report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in 
writing from the parole office. 
2. ABSCONDING: I will not abscond from parole supervision: 
A. Reporting: I will report as directed by the Department of Corrections 
B. Residence: I will establish and reside at a residence of record and 
will not change my residence without first obtaining permission from 
my parole agent. 
C. Leaving the State: I will not leave my state of residence, even 
briefly, or any other state to which I am released or transferred 
without prior written permission from my parole agent. 
3. CONDUCT: I will obey all State, Federal and municipal laws. If 
arrested , cited or guestioned by a peace officer, I will notify my 
parole agent within 48 hours of the incident. 
4. HOME VISITS: I will permit visits to my place of residence by agents of 
Adult Probation and Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the 
conditions of my parole. I will not interfere with requirement; i.e. 
having vicious dogs, perimeter security doors, refusing to open the door, 
etc. 
5. SEARCHES: I will permit agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search 
my person, residence, vehicle or any other property under my control, 
without a warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion 
to ensure compliance with the conditions of my parole. 
6. WEAPONS: I will not own, possess, have under my control or in my 
custody any explosives, firearms or dangerous weapons as defined in Utah 
Code Annotated. Section 76-10-501, as amended. 
7. EMPLOYMENT: Unless otherwise authorized by my parole agent, I will seek, 
obtain and maintain verifiable, lawful full-time employment (32 hours per 
week minimum) as approved by my parole agent. I will notify my parole 
agent of any change in employment within 48 hours. 
8. ASSOCIATION: I will not knowingly associate with any person who is 
involved in criminal activity or who has been convicted of a felony, 
without approval from my parole agent. 
9. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS: I will submit to test of my breath, body fluids or hair 
to ensure compliance with my parole agreement. 
10. TRUTHFULNESS: I will be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all my 
dealings with Adult Probation and Parole. 
11. SPECIAL CgNDITIONS ;_LyUI; , 
^s*^ I Successfully complete ISP Program. 
sffMZ. 2 Submit to random drug testing. 
sZ*C- 3 Successfully complete Mental Health Therapy. 
Zc J* 4 Not be self employed with legal business license, taxes and 
v>_CJ 5 approval of Parole Officer. 
Pj+jS. 6 Provide Parole Officer with documentation of employer 
^ ^ contracts. 
I have read, understand and agree to be bound by this agreement. If I violate 
any of the conditions of this agreement, the Board of Pardons may revoke my 
parole or the Department of Corrections may take other appropriate action 
against me. oj>/y ; /? TA* 0e**S fct*c/vf*s * "**" f*"»f< *'" 
g/py/P^ SIGNED: J Z ^ jg&ZZ*^/} USP NO: 4^£^z 
~DATE 
h!L WITNESSED BY: 
AUTHORIZED BY: /^^sGL r^E^S?^^— BOARD OF PARDONS 
00015 
ADDENDUM D 
STATE v. RUESGA 
CIUMSSI PJd 1229 (UtahApp. 1993) 
fy the prosecutor from the sentencing hear- 4. Criminal Law «=»982.6(.5) 
ing. Accordingly, Gray's convictions are 
affirmed. 
Utah 1229 
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
® «y NUMMI SYSTIM> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Fernando RUESGA, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 920426-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 22, 1993. 
Probation revocation proceeding was 
brought The Salt Lake County District 
Court, Timothy R. Hanson, J., revoked pro-
bation. Defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Orme, J., held that defendant's 
failure to sign probation agreement was a 
willful violation of probation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law *»982.9(.5) 
Determination to revoke probation is 
within discretion of trial court 
1 Criminal Law *»114? 
Court of Appeals will reverse trial 
court's determination on whether to revoke 
probation only if evidence, when viewed in 
light most favorable to court's decision, is 
so deficient that it must be concluded trial 
court abused its discretion. 
S. Criminal Law *»U58Q) 
Trial court's underlying factual find-
ings supporting conclusion that defendant 
violated probation will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Defendant is free to accept court's of-
fer to spend time under probation or to 
decline court's good grace and spend entire 
sentence in prison. 
5. Constitutional Law *»27<K5) 
Due process requires conditions of pro-
bation to be clear enough so that defendant 
has notice as to what constitutes probation 
violation. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
6. Constitutional Law e»27<X5) 
Criminal Law *»982.9<1) 
Defendant was not denied due process 
when trial court revoked probation based 
on his refusal to sign probation agreement, 
although court did not specifically state 
during sentencing that signing probation 
agreement was a condition of probation, 
where at first hearing on motion to show 
cause trial court told defense counsel, with 
defendant at his side, that it would contin-
ue hearing for two weeks but if defendant 
did not sign probation agreement, he was 
going to prison and defendant failed to sign 
agreement U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
7. Criminal Law *»982.9<5) 
For trial court to revoke probation 
based on violation of probation, it must 
determine by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that violation was willful or, if not 
willful, must presently threaten safety of 
society. U.CJL1953, 77-18-1(10). 
8. Criminal Law *»982.9<6) 
Trial court entered ample oral and 
written findings to support conclusion that 
defendant willfully refused to sign proba-
tion agreement and therefore violated pro-
bation; after considering testimony from 
both sides court specifically found that pro-
bation officer's testimony was believable 
and credible while defendant's testimony 
was not, defendant manifested attitude 
that he could do what he wanted, and de-
fendant's language suggested refusal to 
cooperate and sign agreement 
9. Criminal Law *»982.9(5) 
Trial court's conclusion that defendant 
understood English well enough to partici-
pate in third hearing on probation revoca-
tion without a translator was not clearly 
1230 Utah 851 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
erroneous; defense counsel agreed that de-
fendant could understand English well 
enough to participate in proceedings, defen-
dant did not ask for translator until begin-
ning of third hearing, and defendant later 
read written statement in English which, 
by his own testimony, he prepared with 
only minimal assistance. 
Roger K. Scowcroft and Elizabeth Hol-
brook, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellant 
Jan Graham and Christine F. Soltis, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 




Defendant appeals the revocation of his 
probation based on his unwillingness to 
sign a probation agreement He argues 
that signing the agreement was not a con-
dition of probation, that his failure to sign 
was not willful, and that he lacked the 
ability to understand the proceedings 
against him. He also contends that the 
trial court's findings supporting its decision 
are in error. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On February 18, 1992, defendant pled 
guilty to one count of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2XaXi) (Supp.1992). On April 6, 
1992, after the Office of Adult Probation 
and Parole had evaluated defendant and 
recommended he be incarcerated, the trial 
court sentenced defendant to a prison term 
of zero to five years and imposed a 15,000 
fine, but stayed the sentence pending com-
pletion of eighteen months probation. The 
court required defendant to spend six 
months in jail and to pay $1,500 of the fine 
plus a twenty-five percent surcharge. At 
sentencing, the court described the general 
conditions of probation, which included pro-
hibitions against possessing controlled sub-
stances and drinking alcohol and directives 
to complete appropriate treatment pro-
grams, to establish a permanent address, 
and to work full time. On April 28, 1992, 
in response to an affidavit filed by defen-
dant's parole officer alleging defendant re-
fused to sign a standard probation agree-
ment, the district court issued an Order to 
Show Cause why defendant's probation 
should not be revoked. Three hearings 
transpired subsequent to that order. 
At the first hearing, on May 4, defen-
dant, through counsel, denied the allega-
tion that he refused to sign the probation 
agreement. However, due to a family 
emergency that had arisen for defense 
counsel, the court granted a two-week con-
tinuance for the hearing. Before conclud-
ing the proceedings, the court warned: "If 
Mr. Ruesga doesn't sign the probation 
agreement, he's going to prison. Simple as 
that" 
When the second hearing commenced on 
May 18, defendant had not yet signed the 
probation agreement. On several occa-
sions throughout the hearing, the court 
asked why the probation agreement had 
not been signed, and defense counsel reiter-
ated defendant's willingness to sign. Yet, 
counsel never stated defendant would do so 
unconditionally, nor did defendant ever ac-
tually sign the agreement, although it was 
apparently available for his signature. De-
fense counsel stated that defendant was 
willing to sign the agreement if the court 
would strike the Order to Show Cause. 
However, from all that appears, even if 
defendant had admitted to the allegations 
in the affidavit, which was the basis for the 
Order to Show Cause, the judge and proba-
tion officer were still willing to proceed 
with probation, providing only that defen-
dant sign the implementing agreement In 
response to the court's inquiry as to the 
State's position in the case, defendant's 
probation officer stated that "[i]f he's will-
ing to sign, we'll give him a try." 
As the hearing continued, the court dis-
covered that defendant had also threatened 
to go to Mexico when he was released from 
jail. Defense counsel never denied defen-
dant's statement or intent to go to Mexico, 
but attempted to explain "[i}t's not his in-
tention to just leave 
He just wants to go to Mexico to see his 
parents/' Upon hearing this, and having 
no signed probation agreement in hand, the 
court, apparently frustrated by defendant's 
recalcitrance, scheduled an evidentiary 
hearing for June 2. 
At the June 2 hearing, defendant re-
quested an interpreter who would translate 
English to Spanish for him. The court 
refused the request Only defendant and 
his parole officer testified at the hearing. 
Defendant's parole officer recounted the 
April 16 incident at the jail when defendant 
refused to sign the agreement She testi-
fied that when she attempted to explain the 
parole agreement the defendant became 
"extremely argumentative," contesting the 
$1,875 fme as incorrect' and claiming the 
agreement did not reflect what took place 
in court According to the parole officer, 
defendant used profanities and vituperative 
epithets directed at the court to exclaim he 
did not have to do what the trial judge told 
him to do. Furthermore, she testified that 
defendant "stated he was going to go to 
Mexico." 
Defendant testified that his lack of profi-
ciency in English led to him misunderstand-
ing the agreement He further explained 
that he did not even know what probation 
was when his probation officer spoke to 
him, that he planned to go to Mexico only 
after he completed his probation obligation 
in Utah and not immediately upon release 
from jail, and that he was willing to do 
everything required to complete his proba-
tion, including signing the probation agree-
ment 
After testimony and arguments conclud-
ed, and after the court orally explained the 
basis for its decision, the trial court termi-
nated its offer to grant probation and com-
mitted the defendant to the Utah State 
Prison. Defendant objected to proposed 
1. The S1J75 figure accurately reflected the trial 
court's reduction of defendant's fine from 
$5,000 to $1,500 plus the required twenty-five 
percent surcharge. 
1 Although the trial court entered a judgment 
upon conviction whereby it placed the defen-
dant on probation, arguably defendant did not 
begin probation until he entered into a written 
STATE v. RUESGA Utah 1231 
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Utah, Your Honor, written findings submitted the next day by 
the State, but on June 9, 1992, the court 
signed those findings. 
Defendant makes the following claims on 
appeal: (1) the court erred by revoking 
probation based on failure to sign the 
agreement and (2) the court's factual find-
ings concerning the willfulness of the pro-
bation violation and the defendant's ability 
to understand English are clearly errone-
ous. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1-31 A determination to revoke proba-
tion is within the discretion of the trial 
court We will reverse only if the evi-
dence, when viewed in a light most favor-
able to the court's decision, is so deficient 
that it must be concluded the trial court 
abused its discretion. State v. Jameson, 
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). Further-
more, the court's underlying factual find-
ings supporting its conclusion that defen-
dant violated probation will not be dis-
turbed unless they are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209 (Utah 
App.1991). 
FAILURE TO SIGN AS PROBATION 
VIOLATION 
[4-6] Defendant's chief argument on 
appeal is that the trial court denied him due 
process by revoking probation based on his 
refusal to sign the probation agreement 
because the court had not explicitly stated 
during sentencing that signing the proba-
tion agreement was a condition of proba-
tion. While due process certainly requires 
conditions of probation to be clear enough 
so that defendant has notice as to what 
constitutes a probation violation, see Doug-
las v. Buder, 412 UJ3. 430, 432, 93 S.Ct 
2199, 2200, 37 LE<L2d 52 (1973), defen-
dant's position in this case is untenable.2 
probation agreement Under Utah law, " lp]ro 
bation' is an act of grace by the court suspend-
ing the imposition or execution of a convicted 
offender's sentence upon prescribed condi-
tions," Utah Code Ann. f 77-27-1(10) (Supp. 
1992). The defendant n free to accept the 
court's offer to spend time under probation or 
to decline the court's good grace and spend the 
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Even if, as defendant claims, he had no 
notice that signing the agreement was a 
condition of probation at the time of sen-
tencing, the record of the first hearing on 
the Motion to Show Cause leaves no doubt 
that defendant was on such notice after 
May 4. As noted above, the court told 
defense counsel, with defendant at his side, 
that it would continue the hearing for two 
weeks, but "[i]f Mr. Ruesga doesn't sign 
the probation agreement, he's going to 
prison. Simple as that" Yet, the agree-
ment remained unsigned two weeks later 
at the May 18 hearing. If anything, the 
trial court was abundantly generous in al-
lowing defendant two weeks to sign a pro-
bation agreement, a simple act that would 
take but a moment 
Defendant asserts that despite the notice 
he received during the first hearing, the 
revocation was based solely on defendant's 
refusal to sign the agreement at the jail, 
not on his failure to sign after the court's 
explicit warning. It follows, he contends, 
that since the court did not tell him at 
sentencing that signing the agreement was 
a condition of probation, he could not have 
violated probation by refusing to sign the 
agreement at the jail on April 16. While it 
is not altogether clear that defendant's ar-
gument would prevail even if termination 
was based on the single refusal to sign at 
the jail, we believe the court's termination 
of probation was correctly based on defen-
dant's refusal to sign the agreement at any 
time after the sentencing hearing, not just 
at the time of the jail incident The agree-
ment was not signed at the jail; it was not 
signed at the May 4 hearing; it was not 
signed in the subsequent two weeks; it 
was not signed at the May 18 hearing. 
While the court's findings, viewed in iso» 
entire sentence in prison. The written proba-
tion agreement, which details the conditions of 
probation, embodies a defendant's acceptance 
of probation and the prescribed conditions. In-
asmuch as a defendant's refusal to sign a proba-
tion agreement manifests an unwillingness to 
accept the conditions of probation, in a sense 
probation never occurs where such unwilling-
ness it demonstrated. If he in fact wanted to 
comply with the terms of his probation, the 
clearest manifestation of such would have been 
to sign the agreement Defendant's reluctance 
to enter into probation is further evidenced by 
lation, appear to emphasize the jail episode, 
the court clearly had in mind this entire 
pattern of refusal in making its revocation 
decision. 
WILLFULNESS OF VIOLATION 
[71 Having concluded that signing the 
probation agreement was a condition of 
defendant's probation, which defendant vio-
lated, we turn to consider whether the 
court correctly concluded defendant violat-
ed that condition willfully. In order for a 
trial court to revoke probation based on a 
violation of probation under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (Supp.1992), it must de-
termine by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the violation was "willful or, if not 
willful, must presently threaten the safety 
of society." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 
2T7 (Utah App.1990). In State v. Archule-
ta, 812 P.2d 80 (Utah App.1991), this court 
held that willfulness "merely requires a 
finding that the probationer did not make 
bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of 
his probation." Id at 84. As applied to 
this case, the Archuleta rationale suggests 
that where defendant did not make a bona 
fide effort to cooperate with probation offi-
cials to initiate his probation, despite warn-
ing by the court, he willfully violated his 
probation. Cf. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 
270, 275 (Utah App.1990) (probationer's ina-
bility to complete treatment program due 
to physiological problem was not willful 
violation because his efforts to participate 
were genuine). Defendant claims the trial 
court's findings do not support the conclu-
sion that the violation was willful. We 
disagree. 
[8] The trial court entered ample oral 
and written findings to support its conclu-
his testimony at the June 2 hearing that, when 
asked to sign the agreement at the jail, "I did say 
that I would rather do all the time, and just get 
out of there without probation." By this se-
quence of events, defendant himself appears to 
have refused probation, which therefore never 
came into being. Seen in this light, there may 
have been no probation to revoke and it is far 
from clear that an evidentiary hearing was even 
required. &*e Utah Code Ann. f 77-18-1(10) 
(Supp.1992). Nonetheless, because this case is 
postured as a probation revocation proceeding, 
we will treat it as such. 
STATE v. RUESGA 
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sion that defendant willfully refused to questing a translator. 
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sign the probation agreement and there-
fore violated probation. At the June 2 
hearing, after considering testimony from 
both sides, the court explained in detail the 
basis for its decision. The court specifical-
ly found: (1) the probation officer's testi-
mony was believable and credible, while the 
defendant's testimony was not; (2) defen-
dant manifested an attitude that he could 
do what he wanted; (3) defendant's lan-
guage suggested a refusal to cooperate 
and sign the agreement; and (4) defendant 
"knowingly and intelligently, and with pur-
pose refused to cooperate with Adult Pro-
bation and Parole and sign the probation 
agreement." Notwithstanding that the 
oral findings alone sufficiently support the 
court's determination that defendant violat-
ed his probation, see Hodges, 798 P.2d at 
274, the court subsequently signed written 
findings, which in essence were a summary 
of the oral findings. 
The court's findings reveal "the evidence 
relied on and the trial court's reasons for 
revoking appellant's probation." Id Con-
trary to defendant's contention that the 
findings are clearly erroneous, we believe 
they are amply supported and form a 
sound basis for the court's decision. The 
findings demonstrate that the court did not 
abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's 
probation. 
DEFENDANTS ABILITY TO 
UNDERSTAND PROCEEDINGS 
[9] Defendant argues the court's addi-
tional finding that defendant could under-
stand the proceedings is clearly erroneous. 
That finding reads: 
3. That the defendant, while having a 
limited understanding of English, has an 
adequate command of the English lan-
guage to fully understand the proceed-
ings before this Court and the conditions 
of probation as presented by [his proba-
tion officer]. 
We believe the court's finding is fully 
supported by the record in this case. De-
fendant appeared at several proceedings in 
circuit court, including a preliminary hear-
ing; an arraignment, at which he pled 
guilty; and two of the three hearings on 
the Motion to Show Cause—all without re-
Despite these ap-
pearances, defendant first asked for a 
translator at the beginning of the third 
hearing on June 2. The judge refused his 
request at that time. Defendant later read 
a written statement in English, which, by 
his own testimony, he prepared with only 
minimal assistance. He testified at the 
hearing with no apparent difficulty. After 
defense counsel referred to defendant's 
"difficulty understanding what he's sup-
posed to do here," the following exchange 
occurred: 
THE COURT: Are you telling me, Mr. 
Scowcroft, that with regard to your 
client's understanding that it's now your 
position that he doesn't understand the 
English language well enough to proceed 
in these proceedings? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: I'm not saying that, 
Judge. We've not had an interpreter 
during these proceedings. There have 
been a number of appearances we've 
made in court— I think his command 
of the English language is somewhat 
marginal and I think his heavy accent is 
evidence of that. That's all I could say 
really in that regard. 
The record largely speaks for itself. In 
light of defense counsel's agreement that 
defendant could understand English well 
enough to participate in the proceedings, 
we would certainly be reluctant to override 
the trial judge who reached the same con-
clusion after having had several opportuni-
ties to view and hear defendant Accord-
ingly, defendant's claim of error is without 
merit 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's failure to sign the probation 
agreement was a willful violation of his 
probation. Moreover, the trial court's con-
clusion that defendant understood English 
well enough to participate in the third hear-
ing without a translator was not clearly 
erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the 
probation revocation. 
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ., concur. 
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